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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
This matter comes on before this court on an appeal from 
an order of the District Court of the V irgin Islands revoking 
appellant Wilhelm Martinez's probation and sentencing him 
to custodial terms. Martinez had served consecutive six- 
month terms of custodial confinement for assault in the 
third degree and burglary in the third degree and was on 
probation when the district court revoked his probation 
because, before it revoked his probation, he had violated 
certain of its terms and conditions. W e will reverse the 
order of the district court because it had imposed a "split 
sentence," i.e., a sentence in which at least a portion of the 
custodial term is suspended and probation is imposed, 
without suspending any portion of the sentence. W e, 
however, will give the district court the opportunity to 
correct its sentence. If the district court corrects the 
sentence by imposing a legal split sentence, the 
reimposition of a custodial sentence for the pr obation 
violation shall be upheld unless Martinez advances a valid 
objection to the revocation and reimposition of sentence on 
grounds we do not address. If the district court does not 
impose a lawful split sentence, the imposition of pr obation 
and thus the sentence for its violation shall be vacated. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
On November 9, 1993, the United States Attor ney filed an 
information in the District Court of the V irgin Islands 
charging Martinez with rape in the first degree in violation 
of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, S 1701(2), Count I; burglary in the 
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first degree in violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, S 442(4), 
Count II; unlawful sexual contact in the first degree in 
violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, S 1708(1), Count III; and 
burglary in the third degree in violation of V.I. Code Ann. 
tit. 14, S 444(1), Count IV. Martinez entered into a plea 
agreement pursuant to which he entered guilty pleas on 
April 29, 1994, to Counts III and IV, assault in the third 
degree (including unlawful sexual contact) in violation of 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, S 297, as a lesser included offense to 
the charge of unlawful sexual contact in thefirst degree, 
and burglary in the third degree in violation of V.I. Code 
Ann. tit. 14, S 441(1). The district court orally sentenced 
Martinez on September 14, 1994, to two years incar ceration 
on Count III and two years incarceration on Count IV to 
run concurrently with each other followed by concurrent 
five-year terms of probation. 
 
Martinez filed a motion for correction of sentence on 
September 21, 1994, asserting that the district court had 
imposed an illegal sentence. Martinez argued that according 
to V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, S 3711(a), a"split sentence" can 
require incarceration up to a maximum of six months 
followed by probationary supervision pursuant to a 
judgment of suspended sentence. He also argued that, 
according to the case law, any sentence that includes a 
period of probation without first including a provision 
suspending a portion of the sentence is illegal and therefore 
should be invalidated or corrected. 
 
The government filed its response to Martinez's motion 
on October 13, 1994, simply stating that the sentence 
imposed was proper. Apparently in r esponse to Martinez's 
motion, the district court on November 19, 1994,filed a 
judgment and commitment effectively reducing Martinez's 
sentence to six months on Count III and six months on 
Count IV, to be served consecutively, followed by two and 
one half years probation on each of the two counts, also to 
be served consecutively. As a condition of pr obation, the 
court required Martinez to remain drug free and to obtain 
psychiatric counseling. The court, however, did not suspend 
any period of incarceration imposed on either count. 
Accordingly, this modified sentence, though obviously 
advantageous to Martinez, did not correct the error in the 
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original sentence that he had identified in his motion to 
correct sentence. Martinez did not appeal fr om this 
judgment. 
 
Martinez subsequently completed service of the six- 
month terms of incarceration and thus began supervised 
probation. Unfortunately, the probation was not uneventful 
for on May 16, 1996, the probation departmentfiled a 
petition for revocation of probation alleging that Martinez 
left the jurisdiction without permission and had enrolled in 
the Love Ministries Program in New York. On February 6, 
1997, Martinez was arrested in New York for the probation 
violation and thereafter was retur ned to St. Croix and was 
detained. At a hearing on the petition for r evocation of 
probation on April 17, 1997, the court or dered that 
Martinez be detained until his placement in a drug 
treatment center. In conformity with that order, on April 22, 
1997, Martinez was placed in The Village South 
Rehabilitation Center in Miami, Florida, wher e he 
completed residential treatment on July 7, 1997, following 
which he returned to St. Croix for placement in a half-way 
house. However, Martinez had problems adjusting to the 
half-way house and on September 16, 1997, was r eturned 
to residential treatment. Although he was directed to take 
medication, he refused to do so. 
 
On November 13, 1997, the probation departmentfiled 
another petition for revocation of probation, alleging that 
Martinez engaged in inappropriate behavior and refused to 
take his prescribed medication. On November 17, 1997, the 
district court conducted a hearing on the petition at which 
Martinez requested psychological testing. Martinez was 
detained and received a psychological evaluation dated 
February 2, 1998, performed by L. Thomas Kucharki, 
Ph.D., Chief Psychologist at the Metropolitan Correction 
Center in New York. Kucharki stated that, in his opinion, 
Martinez does not suffer from a mental illness or mental 
defect but has a long history of substance abuse and 
dependence. Although Kucharki recognized that Martinez 
has a strong psychopathic style and qualifies for a 
diagnosis of having an antisocial personality disor der, he 
indicated that substance abuse and an antisocial 
personality disorder do not qualify as mental illnesses or 
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mental defects within the meaning of the law. Indeed, 
according to Kucharki, Martinez exhibited signs of 
malingering and "feigning" mental illness. Kucharki 
recommended that Martinez be admitted into a r esidential 
drug abuse treatment program if he was sentenced to 
incarceration. 
 
After Kucharki completed the evaluation, the district 
court conducted a hearing on May 4, 1998, on the petition 
charging violation of the terms and conditions of probation. 
The court held that Martinez had violated the ter ms and 
conditions of his probation and thus deter mined that it 
should revoke his probation. After initially entering an 
order imposing two consecutive six-month custodial terms, 
the court entered an amended order on May 22, 1998, 
sentencing Martinez to 30-month custodial ter ms on Count 
III and Count IV to be served consecutively. In r esponse, 
Martinez filed a timely notice of appeal to this court and 
sent two letters in the district court which it tr eated as a 
timely motion for reconsideration. He then moved in this 
court to stay his appeal and remand the case to the district 
court. We granted that motion on January 4, 1999, and 
thus we remanded the case to the district court. 
 
The district court ordered a second psychological 
evaluation on October 27, 1998, which was completed and 
filed on September 8, 1999. In that evaluation, Dr . Olaf 
Hendricks found Martinez to be free of psychopathology but 
stated that as a chronic substance abuser Martinez is 
manipulative. In Hendricks' opinion, Martinez was not 
dangerous, and his "occasional behavioral pr oblems are 
directly related to his addictive dynamics." App. at 84. On 
October 6, 1999, the district court held a hearing on 
Martinez's motion for reconsideration and denied the 
motion, a determination which it formalized in an order of 
October 27, 1999. 
 
Thereafter, on June 12, 2000, we filed an order vacating 
the stay of Martinez's appeal. The issues that we now 
address are (1) whether the district court erred in 
sentencing Martinez to incarceration for violation of the 
terms of probation where the "split" sentencing order did 
not explicitly suspend the execution of a portion of the 
sentence as contemplated by V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, S 3711, 
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and where Martinez served the custodial sentence imposed; 
(2) If the district court imposed an illegal sentence, whether 
we should remand the case for it to resentence Martinez 
pursuant to V.I. R. Crim. P. 35.1(a) or whether we should 
vacate the sentence; and (3) whether the district court 
abused its discretion in revoking Martinez's probation and 
sentencing him to incarceration inasmuch as the custodial 
facility in which he was to be confined did not have 
appropriate mental health services. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Jurisdiction 
 
The district court had jurisdiction under the Revised 
Organic Act, 48 U.S.C. S 1612, and under V.I. Code Ann. 
tit. 4 S 32, and we have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. S 3742 
and 28 U.S.C. S 1291. To the extent that this appeal 
involves the application of legal principles we exer cise 
plenary review, see United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 
123 n.4 (3d Cir.), cert. denied , 528 U.S. 1063, 120 S.Ct. 
618 (1999), but insofar as the appeal involves the 
revocation of probation we review the district court's order 
on an abuse of discretion basis. See Bur ns v. United States, 
287 U.S. 216, 222, 53 S.Ct. 154, 156 (1932); United States 
v. D'Amato, 429 F.2d 1284, 1286 (3d Cir . 1970). 
 
B. The Split Sentence 
 
We are satisfied that the district court erred both in 
imposing its original sentence and in sentencing Martinez 
in response to his motion to correct sentence inasmuch as 
it did not on either occasion explicitly suspend the 
execution of a portion of the sentence. Although some 
courts of appeals have held that suspension of a portion of 
a sentence can be implied in a split sentence not stating 
specifically that the court has suspended a portion of the 
sentence, we have held that a split sentence that imposes 
probation without suspending a portion of the sentence is 
illegal. See United States v. Guevremont , 829 F.2d 423, 427 
(3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Stupak , 362 F.2d 933, 934 
(3d Cir. 1966) ("The court may not r equire a defendant to 
submit to probationary supervision unless the execution of 
part of his prison term is suspended . . . . Absent such a 
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suspension the authority of the court over the defendant 
during the period of probation is lacking . . .. The 
probation order was therefore invalid."). 
 
Our holdings, though rendered on appeal fr om 
prosecutions in United States district courts under federal 
law prior to the enactment of the Sentencing Refor m Act of 
1984 rather than on appeal from prosecutions in the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands under Virgin Islands 
law, are consistent with V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, S 3711 which 
provides: 
 
       Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any of fense 
       against the laws of the Virgin Islands not punishable 
       by life imprisonment, the district court or a territorial 
       court, when satisfied that the ends of justice and the 
       best interest of the public as well as the defendant will 
       be served thereby, may suspend the imposition or 
       execution of sentence and place the defendant on 
       probation for such period and upon such ter ms and 
       conditions as the court deems best. 
 
Section 3711 further provides that when the maximum 
punishment exceeds six months for a particular of fense, 
the court may impose a sentence in excess of six months 
but provide that the defendant remain in confinement for a 
period not exceeding six months with the execution of the 
remainder of the sentence suspended and the defendant 
placed on probation for such period and upon such terms 
and conditions as the court deems best.1  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We note that section 3711 is very similar to 18 U.S.C. S 3651, which 
Congress repealed effective in 1987. 18 U.S.C. S 3651 provided: "Upon 
entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death 
or life imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction to try offenses 
against 
the United States . . . may suspend the imposition or execution of 
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon 
such terms and conditions as the court deems best." This "split- 
sentence" provision of 18 U.S.C. S 3651 was the "sole source of the 
district courts' power to suspend the execution of sentences; a federal 
court has no inherent power to suspend sentences or place defendants 
upon probation." United States v. Cohen , 617 F.2d 56, 58 (3d Cir. 1980); 
see also United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co. , 465 F.2d 58, 60 (7th 
Cir. 
1972). Of course, the repeal of 18 U.S.C. S 3651 had no effect on section 
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Nevertheless, even in the absence of a written judgment 
reflecting that the court is suspending a part of the 
sentence, if the district court orally states when imposing 
sentence that it is suspending part of the sentence, the oral 
sentence takes precedence over the judgment. See United 
States v. Raftis, 427 F.2d 1145, 1146 (8th Cir. 1970); see 
also United States v. Chasmer, 952 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir. 
1991). Here, however, there is nothing in the record 
suggesting that the district court orally suspended part of 
Martinez's sentence and the judgment was silent on the 
point. 
 
Yet the absence of either a judgment or an oral direction 
for the suspension of sentence is not necessarily fatal to the 
validity of a split sentence for courts of appeals have held 
that even if the district court does not state specifically that 
it is suspending a portion of the sentence when imposing a 
split sentence, it impliedly may have done so. For example, 
in United States v. Makres, 851 F .2d 1016, 1017 (7th Cir. 
1988), Makres appealed from an order revoking his 
probation, contending that the district court failed to state 
specifically that it was suspending a portion of the sentence 
in which it imposed probation. The court of appeals held 
that the district court did not abuse its discr etion in 
resentencing Makres for violation of pr obation because it 
was implicit in the district court's judgment that it was 
suspending sentence. Id. at 1018, citing Raftis, 427 F.2d at 
1146. The court of appeals reasoned that suspension and 
probation "go hand in hand" and the imposition of one 
without the other is illegal. Moreover, the court indicated 
that it is not likely that a district court ever intends to 
impose an illegal sentence. See Makres , 851 F.2d at 1019. 
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the typical defendant 
violating the terms and conditions of pr obation would not 
anticipate that the penalty merely would be a r equirement 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3711 which remains operative. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 
U.S.C. S 3561, however, changed the sentencing landscape for it 
"provides for the imposition of a sentence of probation." U.S.S.G. S 5B1.1 
cmt. background (2000). Thus, even though split sentences have been 
abolished in the district courts in prosecutions under federal law, in an 
appropriate case a district court may impose a sentence of probation. 
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for completion of the probation. Id. W e also point out that 
the "carrot" and "stick" appr oach to probation is based on 
the theory that rehabilitation without confinement is 
possible only if the court has a continuing power to impose 
punishment for the original offense if the defendant violates 
probation. See Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272, 
64 S.Ct. 113, 117 (1943). 
 
McHugh v. United States, 230 F.2d 252, 255 (1st Cir. 
1956), is similar to Makres as in McHugh the court held 
that although it is desirable that a district court expressly 
suspend part of a sentence when imposing a split sentence, 
it is not absolutely essential that it do so and that at times 
it can be inferred that the court suspended sentence. In 
that regard the court reasoned that 18 U.S.C. S 3651, 
repealed as of 1987, which provided for suspension of 
sentence and imposition of a term of pr obation, did not 
require an express suspension of imprisonment. The court 
believed that this omission supported its view that it is 
possible for a district court to imply that it is suspending 
sentence. Id. See also Raftis, 427 F .2d at 1146 ("[T]he 
intent to suspend the sentence flows from the language 
used in the verbal pronouncement of the sentence and . . . 
impreciseness of language will not negate the court's 
obvious intent."). 
 
However, we have not followed the cases suggesting that 
a court may suspend a sentence by implication. In 
Guevremont, 829 F.2d at 423-24, we held that a modified 
sentencing order which imposed a sentence of pr obation 
but did not specifically suspend a part of the sentence was 
illegal but the court could correct it under Fed. R. Crim. P. 
35(a). Similarly, in Stupak, 362 F.2d at 934, we held that a 
two-year period of probation, later reduced to eight months, 
imposed without a suspended sentence was illegal. 
 
Here, because there is no evidence that the district court 
explicitly stated that it was suspending the sentences it 
imposed either originally or on Martinez's motion for 
correction of sentence, the sentences wer e illegal under V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 5, S 3711(a). Thus, we cannot affirm the 
order sentencing Martinez for violation of pr obation as the 
district court did not impose a valid probationary term. 
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C. Remanding for Resentencing 
 
Our conclusion that the district court erroneously 
sentenced Martinez for violation of probation does not end 
our inquiry. Virgin Islands Rule of Criminal Procedure 35.1 
provides that the "court may correct an illegal sentence 
imposed pursuant to Virgin Islands law at any time and 
may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within 
the time provided herein for the r eduction of sentence."2 
The sentence in Guevremont is an example of an illegal 
sentence rather than a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner for in that case "the court imposed pr obation 
without suspend[ing] sentence [and thus] the probation 
exceeded the statutory limits."3 Guevremont, 829 F.2d at 
427. As an illegal sentence, therefore, it could be corrected 
at any time by the district court under the version of Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 35(a) in effect prior to 1987. Id. 
 
Here, as in Guevremont, the sentence was illegal because 
the court imposed a term of probation without suspending 
at least a portion of the sentence as requir ed by V.I. Code 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. V.I. R. Crim. P. 35.1 is very similar to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) as it 
read 
before it was amended and as it still applies to offenses committed before 
November 1, 1987. That version of Rule 35(a) pr ovided that the court 
may correct an illegal sentence at any time. Under the current Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 35(a), the court "shall corr ect a sentence that is determined on 
appeal under 18 U.S.C. S 3742 to have been imposed in violation of law, 
to have been imposed as a result of an incorr ect application of the 
sentencing guidelines, or to be unreasonable, upon remand of the case 
to the court-- (1) for imposition of a sentence in accord with the 
findings 
of the court of appeals; or (2) for further sentencing proceedings if, 
after 
such proceedings, the court determines that the original sentence was 
correct." 
 
3. "[I]llegal sentences are essentially only those which exceed the 
relevant 
statutory maximum limits or violate double jeopar dy or are ambiguous 
or internally contradictory. Sentences imposed in an illegal manner are 
within the relevant statutory limits but ar e imposed in a way which 
violates defendant's right, under Rule 32, to be addressed personally at 
sentencing and to speak in mitigation of punishment, or his statutory 
right to be asked about his prior convictions in a proceeding to impose 
an enhanced sentence in a narcotics conviction, or his right to be 
sentenced by a judge relying on accurate infor mation or considerations 
solely in the record . . . ." Guevremont, 829 F.2d at 427, quoting 8AJ. 
Moore, Moore's Federal Practice P 35.03[2] (2d ed. 1987). 
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Ann. tit. 5 S 3711(a). Therefore, under V.I. R. Crim. P. 35.1, 
the district court may correct the sentence at any time, 
even now. We therefore will r emand the matter to the 
district court to give it the opportunity to corr ect the 
sentence it imposed in its judgment of November 19, 1994. 
 
There are, of course, two ways that the court can correct 
the sentence. First, the court could impose a split sentence 
including both a custodial and probationary ter m with the 
custodial portion partially suspended. Second, the court 
could cure the sentencing error by vacating the provision 
for probation. 
 
If the court on remand contemplates imposing a split 
sentence with a portion of the custodial ter m suspended, it 
should consider certain issues before doing so including its 
sentencing plan when it sentenced Martinez originally and 
on his motion to correct his sentence. In Guevremont we 
concluded that there were no constitutional or other 
inhibitions restricting the correction of the sentence 
because the possibility of judicial vindictiveness was low. 
See Guevremont, 829 F.2d at 424. Moreover, we explained 
that "(1) [T]he sentencing judge's intentions were made 
clear, (2) the correction simply makes the sentence conform 
to the sentencing judge's original and inter dependent 
sentencing plan, and (3) Guevremont was neither surprised 
nor prejudiced by the change in his sentence, for he had 
induced the court to reduce the sentence by his promise of 
restitution." Id. Here, however , we are not aware of any 
evidence that the district court expressly stated its 
intentions either when it originally sentenced Martinez or 
subsequently imposed the modified sentence in r esponse to 
Martinez's motion to correct his sentence. 
 
But even if the court did not state specifically that it was 
suspending the sentence, the fact that it reduced the 
sentence after Martinez filed his motion to corr ect the 
sentence could have made Martinez aware that the court's 
intention was to suspend part of the sentence, specifically 
the portion of the custodial term imposed originally but 
eliminated after Martinez made his motion to corr ect the 
sentence. Thus, we believe that even at this late date it 
would not be unfair for the court to impose a legal split 
sentence on Martinez. See Guevremont, 829 F.2d at 428 
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(allowing probation order to be vacated or allowing a 
defendant to avoid consequences of violating pr obation 
would thwart the intent of the court's sentencing plan). 
Furthermore, it is difficult to understand how Martinez 
would be prejudiced by the district court's delay in 
imposing a legal split sentence, as he reasonably should 
have expected that he would suffer negative consequences 
if he violated the terms and conditions of his probation 
even if the court did not impose a legal split sentence. In 
this regard, we point out that we har dly would take 
seriously any suggestion that a defendant on pr obation 
might violate terms and conditions of the pr obation that he 
otherwise would have obeyed on the theory that a court 
later would invalidate the probationary ter m. 
 
Of course, as we have indicated, the court may corr ect 
the sentence by vacating the portion of it pr oviding for 
probation. See Stupak, 362 F.2d at 934. We, however, 
doubt that it should do so. As we explained in Guevremont, 
in Stupak it was appropriate to vacate the probation order 
because there was no indication of the ter m of 
imprisonment the court originally intended to impose and 
suspend. See Guevremont, 829 F .2d at 429. In Guevremont, 
however, there was an original sentence followed by a 
correction (a reduced sentence), and the court's intent was 
clear. Id. 
 
We reiterate that the court originally imposed a sentence 
of two years of incarceration on each count (to run 
concurrently) and five years probation for each count (to 
run concurrently) on September 14, 1994. Martinez then 
filed his motion to correct the sentence on September 21, 
1994, arguing that the sentence imposed violated the 
maximum incarceration time as provided by V.I. Code Ann. 
tit. 5, S 3711(a) and that part of the sentence should be 
suspended according to Stupak. After that, the court 
imposed a reduced custodial sentence of six months on 
each count to be served consecutively as well as two and a 
half years of probation on each count to be served 
consecutively, thus complying with V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, 
S 3711, which limits the custodial time that may be 
required to six months when a split sentence is imposed. In 
the circumstances it would seem to be unjustifiable for 
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Martinez to receive the benefit of having his custodial term 
greatly reduced without suffering the burden of being 
placed on probation.4 
 
D. Revocation of probation 
 
Finally we reach the question of whether the district 
court properly revoked Martinez's pr obation, as this issue 
will be germane if the district court on r emand imposes a 
valid split sentence. Applying an abuse of discr etion 
standard of review, we are satisfied that the district court 
did not err in revoking Martinez's probation and sentencing 
him to periods of incarceration.5  In this regard we observe 
that to revoke probation the district court needs to be only 
reasonably satisfied that the defendant has violated its 
terms and conditions. See D'Amato, 429 F.2d at 1286. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Our disposition does not deprive Martinez fr om arguing on the remand 
that the court should not impose a split sentence with a portion 
suspended because to do so would violate any principle of law that we 
have not addressed including double jeopar dy principles. See, however, 
Baker v. Barbo, 177 F.3d 149, 157-59 (3d Cir. 1999); Guevremont, 829 
F.2d at 428 ("We believe that the cases mentioned above support the 
view that . . . the district court's order corr ecting the illegal 
sentence was 
appropriate and does not bring to bear double jeopardy concerns of 
possible judicial vindictiveness."); United States v. Allen, 588 F.2d 183, 
185 (5th Cir. 1979) ("When a court discovers that it has entered a 
sentence that does not conform to applicable statutes, it has a duty to 
correct the sentence even though service of the sentence first imposed 
has begun. This is true even if the correct sentence may be more 
onerous."); United States v. Clayton, 588 F.2d 1288, 1291 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(The court's sentence correcting a prior illegal sentence did not violate 
Fifth Amendment double jeopardy protection even though it was more 
severe than the original sentence because the r ecord showed that the 
more severe sentence was imposed because of appellant's conduct in 
failing to obey the court's order). See also United States v. Goggins, 99 
F.3d 116, 118 (3d 1996) (for double jeopar dy purposes, "if a conviction 
of one count of a multi-count indictment is vacated on appeal, on 
remand the district court may resentence the defendant to an increased 
sentence on the remaining counts so long as the total reimposed sentence 
does not exceed the original sentence.") (emphasis added). 
 
5. While we are conditionally upholding the order revoking probation and 
the sentence the court imposed, we are not pr ecluding the district court 
from imposing a different sentence on remand. 
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Martinez argues that revocation pr oceedings are subject 
to due process requirements because they result in a loss 
of liberty, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 
S.Ct. 1756, 1760 (1973); United States v. Bar nhart, 980 
F.2d 219, 222 (3d Cir. 1992), and that implicit in due 
process rights is that prisoners receive treatment for their 
illnesses during their period of incarceration. See Inmates 
of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F .2d 754, 762-63 (3d 
Cir. 1979). At the hearing on revocation of probation, the 
court recommended at Martinez's request that he receive 
psychiatric counseling during his incarceration. The court 
nevertheless stated during the hearing: "I r ealize that the 
facilities locally are [nonexistent] for counseling." App. at 
54-55. Martinez argues that inmates with serious mental 
illnesses are entitled to be diagnosed and tr eated by 
qualified professionals and that failur e of a penal 
institution to do so violates the Due Process Clause. See 
Inmates of Allegheny County Jail, 612 F.2d at 763. 
Therefore, Martinez argues that he should have been 
continued on probation, given a more stringent probation, 
or sentenced to a shortened incarceration period rather 
than being sentenced to incarceration wher e treatment for 
mental illnesses may not be available. 
 
In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-05, 97 S.Ct. 285, 
290-91 (1976), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the government from being deliberately indifferent 
to a prisoner's serious medical needs, and that the 
government has an obligation to provide medical care for 
people being punished by incarceration. In Inmates of 
Allegheny County Jail, 612 F.2d at 763, we held, inter alia, 
that a remand was required to deter mine whether the level 
of psychiatric care at the prison met the constitutional 
requirement that inmates with serious mental or emotional 
illnesses be provided reasonable access to medical 
personnel qualified to diagnose and treat such illnesses. We 
indicated that "[a]lthough negligence in the administration 
of medical treatment to prisoners is not itself actionable 
under the Constitution, failure to provide adequate 
treatment is a violation of the eighth amendment when it 
results from `deliberate indiffer ence to a prisoner's serious 
illness or injury.' " Id. at 762, quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 
105, 97 S.Ct. at 291. 
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The two-pronged Estelle test for a cognizable claim under 
a civil rights statute because of inadequate medical care in 
prison requires that there be deliberate indifference on the 
part of prison officials and that the prisoner's medical 
needs be serious. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 
290-91. Thus, we held in Inmates of Allegheny County Jail 
that when inmates with serious mental illnesses ef fectively 
are prevented from being diagnosed and treated by qualified 
professionals, there has been a due pr ocess violation. See 
Inmates of Allegheny County Jail, 612 F.2d at 763; see also 
Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 425-26 (3d Cir. 1990); 
Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
From the record here, however , it does not appear that 
Martinez has a serious medical illness, one of the two 
requirements of the Estelle standard. After all, the 
evaluations to which we already have referred concluded 
that Martinez did not have a serious mental illness. 
Furthermore, even if he had a serious mental illness, we 
would be reluctant to allow him to avoid a sentence of 
incarceration which, in the absence of the illness, would be 
appropriate. Rather, we think that if he had such an illness 
his remedy if his needs were not met would be in a civil 
action seeking the treatment. 
 
Laying aside Martinez's claim for treatment, which as we 
have indicated will not inform our result on the revocation 
of probation issue, we find that the district court's 
disposition was appropriate. In this regar d, the record 
shows that Martinez violated the terms of his probation 
more than one time. After leaving the V irgin Islands and 
failing to report to his probation officer, he was 
apprehended in New York. The district court disposed of 
those violations by ordering that he complete r esidential 
and outpatient treatment programs. However , Martinez 
threatened harm to other patients and also made 
inappropriate sexual advances towards patients and staff 
even though the evaluations by mental health pr ofessionals 
indicated that he did not suffer from mental illness. Plainly, 
it is entirely appropriate that Martinez be punished and in 
the circumstances the district court clearly did not abuse 
its discretion when it revoked Martinez's probation and 
sentenced him to a period of incarceration. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will r everse the order of the 
district court and remand the case to that court for further 
proceedings. On the remand the district court should 
correct the illegal sentence by imposing a legal split 
sentence or by vacating the provision for ter ms of 
probation. Of course, if the court vacates the provision for 
probation, then it should vacate the finding that Martinez 
violated the terms and conditions of pr obation as well as 
the sentence imposed for the violation. If the court imposes 
a split sentence, it again may revoke Martinez's probation 
and reinstate the sentence it imposed on Martinez for 
violating probation. Our disposition is without prejudice to 
Martinez advancing any argument on remand that we have 
not addressed as to why the court should not impose a 
split sentence. 
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